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An Ode to Sea Turtles & Dolphins: 
Expanding WTO’s Mandate to Bridge the Trade-Environment Divide 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Rio Earth Summit (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development) in 1992 first 
recognized the importance of ensuring that trade and environmental policies are compatible and 
supportive of sustainable development.1 Since then, however, the globalization of world economy 
and the transboundary nature of many environmental problems have only exacerbated the tension 
between the two regimes of international law: the multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) 
and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).2 The potential for conflict between these two has 
commanded attention for a long time, although actual conflict has not occurred yet.3    
 Some scholars emphasize that free trade by itself is not a direct cause of environmental 
degradation.4 Even without trade, the production and consumption of environmentally harmful 
products will continue in national markets, if the value of environmental goods is not appreciated 
accordingly.5 Instead, it is a matter of market failure as the value of environmental goods is not 
                                           
1 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz. June 3–14, 1992, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I 
(Aug. 12, 1992). 
2 Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of 
Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 404 (2014) 
3 Id. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body have never ruled on the inconsistency of the trade provisions of 
the MEAs with the obligations of the WTO regime. 
4 Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
— LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 162–64 (1993). 
5 Id. 
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reflected in the price of goods and services.6 Economists call this phenomenon, “the failure of 
internalization of environmental costs.” 7  In the meantime, other economists argue that 
international trade hurts the global natural environment.8 Thus, there is no consensus even 
among economists, let alone among environmentalists, on whether trade harms the environment.  
The ultimate aim of environmentalists differs significantly from that of free traders.9 
Environmentalists view the WTO’s efforts to be biased in favor of trade, because they fear that the 
principles of free trade would override even legitimate efforts for environmental protection.10 The 
MEAs seek to protect the environment, even if achieving this goal requires prohibiting the free 
flow of products across borders.11 On the other hand, the WTO’s priority is on liberalizing trade 
by lowering trade barriers and providing a forum for efficient resolution of trade disputes.12 In the 
eyes of free traders, the use of trade restrictions as a tool for enforcing environmental goals goes 
against their efforts to reduce trade barriers.13 Even without explicit conflict, simply the existence 
and purpose of WTO may have the effect of dwarfing environmental causes.   
Achieving mutual supportiveness between MEAs and WTO rules will strongly enhance 
global governance of sustainable development. Achieving this, however, will involve harnessing 
considerable political will in order to establish the necessary legal and policy framework that will 
                                           
6 FORD RUNGE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE 8 (1991)  
7 Id. 
8 See generally BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE 
OF THE WORLD (2001). 
9 TRISH KELLY, THE IMPACT OF THE WTO: THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOVEREIGNTY 3 
(2007). 
10 Id. 
11 For example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
contains import and export restrictions, and imposes permitting requirements for species in trade. In fact, 
its whole purpose is to directly impact on international trade in order to protect endangered species. See 
infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text. 
12 See KELLY, supra note 9, at 3–4.  
13 Id. at 4. 
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underpin this relationship. Actions to be taken are both institutional and substantive. Therefore, a 
variety of solutions, both within the WTO and beyond, should be considered and developed.  
Unfortunately, the conundrum of finding the most effective way of harmonizing the two 
regimes remains unanswered.14 Therefore, it is meaningful to examine and evaluate possible 
solutions to this problem. In fact, there is already much in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) to deal with environment-related trade issues. Article XX of the GATT on the 
General Exceptions provides for the adoption of measures to protect human, animal and plant life 
and health and to preserve exhaustible natural resources.15  
 The purpose of this paper is therefore to examine what have been the past attempts by 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body to tackle this issue and to suggest better solutions. Bearing in mind 
that the WTO-MEA clash is potentially a serious source of conflict in the near future, this paper 
seeks to comprehensively review the subject, examine potential ways to harmonize the two 
regimes, and suggest a solution.  
 
II. CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 
1. Environment-Related Rules in the WTO  
A. Most Favored Nation, National Treatment, and Quantitative Restrictions 
The GATT advances two fundamental principles of international trade law: Most Favored 
Nation (“MFN”) and National Treatment (“NT”).16 MFN means that WTO Members are required 
                                           
14 See, e.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE 
ENVIRONMENT 753–66 (2009). 
15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
16 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 36 (3d ed. 2013). 
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to grant the same benefits to equivalent goods regardless of the country of origin.17 NT essentially 
means treating foreign and domestic products equally.18 In addition, GATT prohibits measures 
that limit the quantity of a product that may be imported or exported.19 When MEAs restrict trade, 
such trade-restrictive measures are most likely to be inconsistent with the principles of MFN, NT 
and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.  
 
B. GATT Article XX 
As mentioned above briefly, Article XX of GATT lays out a number of specific instances 
in which WTO Members may be exempted from trade rules. 20 Article XX provides for the 
adoption of measures to protect human, animal and plant life and health and to preserve exhaustible 
natural resources. 21  The chapeau of Article XX establishes as threshold requirements that a 
measure must not be applied in a manner constituting a means of “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” 
discrimination between countries or a “disguised” restriction on international trade. 22  WTO 
Members are allowed to protect their right to adopt and enforce measures falling within any of the 
                                           
17 Id. at 316.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 481. 
20 The full relevant text of Article XX reads as follows: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption of enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
… 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health…; 
… 
… 
… 
… 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” 
GATT, supra note 15, art. XX. 
21 Id. 
22 See BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 14, at 774–76. 
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ten categories. Significant among the ten categories are Article XX(b) and Article XX(g).23 
 Article XX(b) concerns the measure “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health.”24 Article XX(g) mentions about the measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”25 
The provisions provide significant interpretative issues in relation to the environment such 
as “like product analysis,” “necessity,” “relating to,” and the interpretation about PPMs (Process 
or Production Methods).  
Members are required to treat “like products” in a similar or equivalent manner, according 
to Article I and Article III, which respectively impose MFN and NT obligations.26 Therefore, how 
to interpret the term “like product” is important. It has been already well established that the “like 
product” analysis should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The criteria for determining 
whether two kinds of products are “like,” are namely: (a) the product’s end-uses in a given market; 
(b) consumers’ tastes and habits; (c) the product’s properties, nature and quality; and (d) the 
product’s tariff classification in the Harmonized System.27 Environmental risks or impacts of a 
product may be considered in a like product analysis as well as under Article XX. Environmental 
risks of a product can be examined when assessing the similarity of two products and the 
consumers’ tastes and habits. Under Article XX, the justifiability and the necessity of a measure 
may also be examined in relation to the environmental risk of a product. For purposes of Article 
XX(b), the term “necessary” has been interpreted to require use of the least GATT inconsistent 
                                           
23 Id. at 759–61. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 GATT, supra note 15, arts. I and III. 
27 Appellate Body Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, ¶ 170, WT/DS403/AB/R (Dec. 21, 
2011). 
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means reasonably available to fulfill the health policy objective.28 The Panel’s interpretation of 
the term “relating to” under Article XX(g) to require a measure to be “primarily aimed at” the 
conservation of the natural resources at issue.29 
 
C. Non-discrimination Principles and PPMs (Processing and Production Methods) 
 Under the GATT, one panel in Tuna – Dolphin I case expressed its view that a process 
and production method (PPM) regulation is an impermissible means for distinguishing products 
for tax or regulatory purposes under the National Treatment and Most Favored Nation obligations 
of GATT.30 
 The NT principle prohibits discrimination between like domestic and imported products, 
and the MFN principle requires that Members do not treat like products of other parties less 
favorably. WTO has treated two products as like products31 if they have the same or similar 
physical characteristics, consumer preferences, end uses, or tariff classifications.32 Some scholars 
subscribe to this view that processes or production methods do not affect products, and therefore 
like products cannot and should not be differentiated based on PPMs.33 However, pointing to the 
fact that the Tuna – Dolphin I panel report remains unadopted, other commentators opine that up 
to now, there is no authoritative interpretation of PPMs.34  
                                           
28 See infra notes 124–132 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 182–206 and accompanying text.  
30 See infra notes 133–150 and accompanying text.  
31 The test for like products is essentially the same for MFN and NT. Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.141, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, 
WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998). 
32 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products 
Containing Asbestos, ¶ 101, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC – Asbestos (AB)]. 
33 PPM regulations do not affect the physical characteristics of a product so they cannot distinguish like 
products. CHRIS WOLD, ET AL., TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY 208 (2d ed. 2005).  
34 See, e.g., Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 249–89 (2000).  
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D. SPS (The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) 
 The SPS Agreement deals with measures designed to protect human, animal and plant life 
or health.35 The SPS Agreement emphasizes the need for scientific justification, calling for not 
maintaining measures without sufficient scientific evidence. 36  Notably, the SPS Agreement 
encourages Members to base their SPS measures on international standards where they exist.37 
Again, the focus on scientific justification comes in, enabling Members to introduce or maintain 
SPS measures that are stricter than those reflected in international standards “if there is a scientific 
justification.”38 Moreover, breaking away from GATT’s rigid rule on PPMs, the SPS Agreement 
provides that in their risk assessment, Members may take into account relevant PPMs and 
ecological/environmental conditions in addition to available scientific evidence.39 Yet another 
important provision allows for adopting provisional SPS measures if relevant scientific evidence 
is insufficient.40 
 
E. TBT (The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade) 
 The TBT Agreement covers other technical standards not regulated by the SPS 
Agreement.41 The TBT Agreement seeks to ensure that technical regulations and standards such 
                                           
35 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493 [Hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
36 Id. arts. 2.1 and 2.2. 
37 The rationale is that this will promote the harmonization of SPS measures. Id. art. 3.2. 
38 Id. art. 3.3. 
39 Id. arts. 5.1 and 5.2. 
40 Id. art. 5.7. See also Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the 
Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 323–90 (2002). 
41 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT 
Agreement]. 
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as packaging, labelling, and marketing requirements do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.42 
The TBT Agreement recognizes that technical regulations may be necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective, including “the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment.”43 Like the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement suggests that both characteristics 
of the product itself, and the process by which it is produced, are relevant in assessing the health 
or environmental risks posed by a product.44 The TBT Agreement also requires Members, in their 
technical regulations, to use relevant international standards where they exist or their completion 
is imminent. 45  However, this requirement is limited if the international standards are an 
inappropriate means for environmental protection.46 The TBT Agreement’s fast track procedure 
further embodies the Members’ belief in the need for environmental regulations.47 Members may 
introduce a technical regulation quickly if there are “urgent problems of safety, health, 
environmental protection or national security.”48  
 
F. TRIPS (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) 
The objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to promote effective and adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights.49 The TRIPS Agreement makes explicit reference to the environment 
in Section 5 on patents.50 The TRIPS Agreement allows Members to refuse to patent inventions 
                                           
42 PHILIPPE SANDS, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 810 (3d ed. 2012). 
43 TBT Agreement, supra note 41, art. 2.2. 
44 Id.; SANDS, ET AL., supra note 42, at 810. 
45 TBT Agreement, supra note 41, art. 2.4. 
46 SANDS, ET AL., supra note 42, at 810. 
47 TBT Agreement, supra note 41, art. 2.10. 
48 Id. 
49 See VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 16, at 954–56.  
50 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
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that may endanger the environment.51 Article 27.2 specifically lists the following as legitimate 
objectives: “to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment.” 52  Additionally, Members can exclude “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals” from patentability.53  
 
G. GATS (The General Agreement on Trade in Services) 
The GATS contains a “general exceptions” clause, Article XIV, similar to GATT Article 
XX.54 The GATS Article XIV starts with a chapeau that is identical to that of GATT Article XX.55 
Just like the GATT Article XX(b), GATS Article XIV(b) allows WTO members to adopt GATS-
inconsistent measures if such measures are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health.”56 Thanks to the identical language in the chapeau, applying GATS-inconsistent measures 
must not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and must not constitute protectionism in 
disguise.57 
 
 Thus, various WTO provisions do provide for environmental exceptions. As mentioned 
above, however, environmentalists fear that pro-trade WTO panels and appellate body would 
override even legitimate efforts for environmental protection.58 In order to see if such fear is 
warranted, it is necessary to analyze GATT/WTO jurisprudence on environment disputes.  
                                           
51 Id. art. 27.2. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. art. 27.3. 
54 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183. 
55 Id. art. XIV. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See KELLY, supra note 9, at 3. 
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2. Trade-Related Measures in the MEAs  
The use of trade measures in international environmental agreements has a long history.59 
For example, the 1933 London Convention controlled and regulated the import, export and traffic 
in certain trophies.60 Other subsequent agreements such as the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention), and the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) establish 
quantitative restrictions on international trade to achieve environmental protection objectives.61 
 
A. CITES 
The objective of CITES is to control international trade so that it does not threaten the 
survival of species of animals and plants facing extinction or endangerment.62 CITES places a 
species in one of three Appendices, according to the degree of protection they need. 63 Appendix 
I includes species threatened with extinction. 64  Trade in this category is permitted only in 
exceptional circumstances. 65  Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened with 
                                           
59 SANDS, ET AL., supra note 42, at 801. 
60 Id. 
61 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 
U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, UNEP Doc. IG.80/L.12 adopted and open for signature, Mar. 22, 
1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; and Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1554 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) 
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
62 Chris Wold, An Analysis of the Relationship between the Trade Restrictions of CITES and the rules of 
the World Trade Organization, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, Jan. 6, 2012, at 1 (Apr. 
23, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/10422-wto-amp-cites-legal-opinion. 
63 Id.  
64 CITES, supra note 61, art. II.1.  
65 Id.  
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extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with 
their survival.66 Lastly, Appendix III contains species that are protected in at least one country, 
which has asked other CITES Parties for assistance in controlling the trade.67  
CITES attempts to protect the listed species through the use of trade restrictions and 
thereby discourages the initial taking of the wildlife. 68  CITES contains import and export 
restrictions, and imposes permitting requirements for species in trade.69 There must be a scientific 
finding that the trade in question will not threaten the existence of the species, if the trade is to be 
allowed.70  
Thus, CITES directly impacts on international trade – that is its whole purpose. The 
implementation of CITES requirements certainly implicates the GATT rules. For example, when 
Country A and Country B are both parties to CITES and WTO, Country A’s decision to deny 
Country B’s request for an export permit because it considers that the trade would be “detrimental 
to the survival of the species”71 could be a direct violation of the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions in GATT Article XI. Other trade restrictions of CITES implicate GATT’s MFN and NT 
obligations. In particular, the “split listing” of species, which might allow some countries to trade 
in “threatened” or “endangered” species while prohibiting others from doing so, would be directly 
contrary to the non-discrimination principle of the WTO. For example, certain populations of 
vicuña are included in Appendix I (no trade), but other populations are included in Appendix II 
(trade permitted).72 Following CITES rules may mean that the United States has to reject imports 
                                           
66 Id. art. II.2. 
67 Id. art. II.3. 
68 See generally id. arts. III–V. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. arts III.2(a), 3(a) and IV(a). 
71 Id. arts. III and IV. 
72 Wold, supra note 62, at 3. 
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of vicuña wool from an Appendix I population from Chile, but allow imports from an Appendix II 
population from Peru.73 The U.S. likely violates its MFN obligation. Similarly, if Peru rejects 
imports of vicuña wool from an Appendix I population from Chile, but allows internal commerce 
in vicuña wool to continue from its own Appendix II populations, then it violates its NT 
obligation.74 
 
B. Basel Convention 
 Basel Convention uses trade measures to limit the market for the transboundary movement 
and disposal of hazardous waste.75 The Convention restricts trade in waste that does not comply 
with the agreement.76 For example, the agreement’s trade provisions encourage the management 
of waste in an environmentally sound manner and with prior informed consent.77 In addition, the 
Basel Convention indirectly encourages the source reduction of hazardous waste by attempting to 
limit disposal capacity alternatives throughout the world.78  
The Basel Convention establishes a prior informed consent procedure for trade in 
hazardous waste and prohibits export of hazardous waste if the importing country cannot dispose 
of it in an environmentally sound manner.79 Only if it can be demonstrated that the importing 
nation “will manage the waste in an environmentally sound manner,” waste shipments can be 
allowed.80 The Basel Convention provides that a party shall not permit hazardous waste or other 
                                           
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Jonathan Krueger, The Basel Convention and the International Trade in Hazardous Wastes, 
YEARBOOK OF INT’L CO-OPERATION ON ENVTL. & DEV. 2001/02, at 44.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 48. 
79 Basel Convention, supra note 61, art. 4.2(e). 
80 Id. 
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wastes to be traded with a non-party unless that party enters into a bilateral, multilateral, or regional 
agreement regarding transboundary movement of hazardous waste with the non-party.81 In the 
case of transfers between parties, other conditions require the exporter to receive the prior informed 
consent of the importing party and any other parties through whose territory the waste will be 
transported.82 In addition, a party may only export hazardous waste if it lacks the technical 
capacity, necessary facilities, or suitable domestic waste-disposal sites.83 A non-party to the Basel 
Convention may receive refusal from the Basel party to trade in hazardous waste.84 Thus, the 
Basel Convention provides incentives to non-parties to either join the Convention or enter into 
alternative bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements governing the transboundary movement 
and disposal of hazardous waste so that they can trade in hazardous waste.85  
On its face, this provision that discriminates against non-parties violates GATT’s 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions. GATT makes it clear that trade bans are generally not 
permitted. This is in direct conflict with Article 4.5 of the Basel Convention which stipulates that 
“A Party shall not permit hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported to a non-Party or to be 
imported from a non-Party.”86 This discriminatory use of trade bans against non-parties is also 
contrary to GATT Article XIII which calls for applying any trade ban equally to all countries.87 
 
C. Montreal Protocol 
 Montreal Protocol seeks to restrict the global market in consumption and production of 
                                           
81 Id. art. 4.5. 
82 Id. art. 6.4. 
83 Id. art. 4.9(a). 
84 KATHARINA KUMMER, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: THE BASEL 
CONVENTION AND RELATED LEGAL RULES 61 (2000). 
85 Id. 
86 Basel Convention, supra note 61, art. 4.5. 
87 GATT, supra note 15, art. XIII:1. 
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Ozone Depleting Substances.88 The agreement contains trade provisions that aim to encourage the 
phase-out of ozone depleting substances.89 The Montreal Protocol reduces the release of ozone 
depleting substances into the atmosphere and provides an incentive for the development of benign 
substitutes for ozone depleting substances. 90  The Montreal Protocol establishes a regime of 
controlled trade for listed substances and a ban on trade in such substances with non-parties.91 The 
prohibitions extend to a ban on the import from non-parties of products containing the substances, 
and to products manufactured with the substances.92 Also, the Montreal Protocol allows limited 
trade in actual ozone depleting substances to promote economic efficiency and further regulate the 
global trade among parties to the Protocol.93 The export of technology to non-parties to assist the 
production of the substances is discouraged.94  
Like the Basel Convention, the Montreal Protocol creates incentives through trade 
measures for non-parties to join it. The Protocol’s trade measures against non-parties are likely 
inconsistent with the GATT principles of MFN, NT, and the elimination of quantitative restrictions. 
 
 In short, facing problems of ecological degradation and global warming, the MEAs seek 
to protect the environment at the expense of free flow of goods across borders. Many trade-
                                           
88 United Nations Environmental Program, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer 2007: A Success in the Making 5, available at 
http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_A_Success_in_the_making-E.pdf. 
89 David G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance 
Procedure, EXECUTIVE REPORTS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 16 
(1996).  
90 Donald L. Goldberg, et al., Effectiveness of Trade & Positive Measures in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: Lessons from the Montreal Protocol, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4, 
7–8, available at http://ciel.org/Publications/EffectivenessofTradeandPosMeasures.pdf.   
91 Id. at 3. 
92 Montreal Protocol, supra note 61, arts. 4.3–4.4. 
93 Id. art. 2. 
94 Id. art. 4.5–4.6. 
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restrictive measures in the MEAs are in direct conflict with GATT’s non-discrimination principles 
and the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions. No party has yet challenged the 
inconsistency of such trade-restrictive measures before the WTO dispute settlement system. 
However, the potential for WTO-MEA conflict abounds.  
 
3. Legal Obligations in the GATT Implicated by MEAs 
MEAs usually do not have trade implications and most WTO provisions do not have 
explicit environmental implications. 95  However, an overlap exists. 96  As noted above, some 
MEAs such as CITES contain trade provisions to limit trade in order to protect the environment.97 
When an MEA authorizes trade between its parties in a specific product, but bans trade in that 
same product with non-parties, then this violates the WTO’s non-discrimination principle.
 MEAs aim to provide incentives for non-parties to participate, and to create measures to 
discourage free riders.98 However, import and export restrictions against non-parties of MEAs 
potentially violate WTO’s MFN principle. For example, a non-party to the Montreal Protocol (on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer) may claim that its like product (e.g., a refrigeration unit 
containing ozone depleting substances) is being discriminated against by a member of the Protocol, 
if both are WTO Members.  
 Similarly, import restrictions of MEAs could go against WTO’s NT principle. For example, 
the Montreal Protocol distinguishes products based on their production and processing methods 
                                           
95 United Nations Environmental Programme, Trade-related Measures and Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements 1–2 (2007), available at 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/areas/pdf/MEA%20Papers/TradeRelated_MeasuresPaper.pdf. 
96 Id. at 2–3. 
97 Id. at 3. 
98 Duncan Brack & Kevin Gray, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11, 18 (2003), available at 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_meas_wto.pdf. 
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although WTO stipulates that a regulatory measure should be directly applied to the product itself.  
 As these examples illustrate, countries that are members of the WTO, but not parties to a 
specific MEA are more likely to challenge the provisions in the MEA. Despite such conflicts, and 
many other accompanying problems, neither trade nor environment can ignore one another. Indeed, 
some scholars point to the fact that free trade simply cannot risk being further diminished by 
systematic opposition from the environmentalists, the free trade coalition being already narrow 
enough.99  
 
III. ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES IN GATT/WTO 
1. Under GATT 
GATT panels considered the GATT consistency of environmental measures that restrict 
trade a number of times. While environmental concerns never prevailed under GATT, over time, 
panelists became more open to accepting trade-restrictive environmental measures. 
 
A. United States – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (1982) 
This case was the first trade dispute pertinent to trade/environment interactions. Canada seized 
19 U.S. tuna vessels caught fishing inside Canada’s fisheries zone.100 The United States retaliated 
by imposing an import ban on all types of tuna and tuna products from Canada pursuant to Section 
205 of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.101 The GATT Panel first found 
that the U.S. import ban is clearly inconsistent with the obligation of the United States under 
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Article XI:1 not to institute quantitative restrictions.102 The United States argued that its measure 
fell within the general exception in Article XX(g) for measures relating to the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource “made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic 
production or consumption.”103 Canada agreed that tuna was an exhaustible natural resource.104  
 The GATT Panel first examined the preamble (chapeau) to Article XX.105 The Panel noted 
the discrimination of Canada was not necessarily arbitrary or unjustifiable because the U.S. also 
imposed similar import bans on imports from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru for similar 
reasons.106 The Panel further found that the U.S. measure was not a disguised restriction on 
international trade because the measure was “taken as a trade measure and publicly announced as 
such.”107 This reasoning is significant because it tends to make the “disguised restriction on 
international trade” part of Article XX’s chapeau hollow.108 If publicly announcing a measure is 
all that is necessary to pass muster under Article XX’s chapeau, this interpretation renders the 
chapeau almost powerless, possibly bringing pressure to interpret the individual paragraphs of 
Article XX more restrictively.109  
 Turning to Article XX(g), the Panel noted that for a measure to be justified under 
subparagraph (g), the measure had to be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production and consumption.110 Because the U.S. provided no evidence that domestic 
production or consumption had been restricted, the Panel rejected the United States’ claim that its 
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measure could be justified under Article XX(g).111  
 
B. Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (1988) 
The issue before the GATT Panel was whether Canada’s prohibitions on the export of 
certain unprocessed herring and salmon were consistent with Canada’s obligations under the 
GATT.112 Canada did not dispute that such prohibitions were inconsistent with the terms of GATT 
Article XI:1 which provides that GATT Members shall not maintain quantitative restrictions.113 
However, Canada invoked Article XX(g) as a justifications for the prohibitions.114  
The GATT Panel agreed with Canada and the United States that salmon and herring stocks 
are “exhaustible natural resources” within the meaning of Article XX(g).115 Turning to examine 
whether the export prohibitions are “relating to” the conservation of salmon and herring stocks 
and whether they are made effective “in conjunction with” the restrictions on the harvesting of 
salmon and herring, the Panel noted that the only previous case concerning Article XX(g) was US 
– Tuna (1982), but that the party invoking Article XX(g) did not maintain restriction on domestic 
production or consumption of tuna and thus Panel did not reach the interpretation of the terms 
“relating to” and “in conjunction with.”116  
The Panel paid particular attention to the language of Article XX. Some of the 
subparagraphs of Article XX state that the measure must be “necessary” or “essential” to the 
achievement of the policy purpose set out in the provision (cf. subparagraphs (a), (b), (d) and (j)) 
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while subparagraph (g) refers only to measures “relating to” the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.117 The Panel takes this as a suggestion that Article XX(g) does not only cover measures 
that are necessary or essential for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources but a wider 
range of measures.118 However, the Panel also noted that pursuant to the chapeau of Article XX, 
the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the GATT was not to widen the scope for measures 
serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the GATT do not 
hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources.119 Thus, 
the Panel concluded that while a trade measure did not have to be necessary or essential to the 
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be “primarily aimed at” the conservation 
of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as “relating to” conservation within the 
meaning of Article XX(g).120 Similarly, the Panel found that a trade measure could only be 
considered to be made effective “in conjunction with” production restrictions if it was “primarily 
aimed at” rendering effective these restrictions.121 
The Panel then determined that Canada’s export prohibitions were neither primarily aimed 
at the conservation of salmon and herring stocks nor primarily aimed at rendering effective the 
restrictions on the harvesting of salmon and herring.122 This was because the export prohibitions 
did not limit access of domestic processors and consumers to salmon and herring supplies at all, 
and only limited the access of foreign processors and consumers to the unprocessed product.123 
The Panel therefore concluded that the export prohibitions were not justified by Article XX(g).124 
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C. Thailand – Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (1990) 
Thailand prohibited imports of cigarettes except under a license issued in accordance with 
its 1966 Tobacco Act.125 Licenses have only been granted to the Thai Tobacco Monopoly and no 
license had been granted for 10 years.126 Thailand had also maintained higher excise taxes on 
imported cigarettes than on domestic ones until just before the Panel heard the dispute.127 Part of 
Thailand’s defenses rested on GATT Article XX(b), which provides an exception from GATT 
obligations for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”128 Thailand 
argued that its trade restrictions were “necessary” to protect its citizens from U.S. cigarettes which 
had additives that might make them more harmful than Thai cigarettes.129  
 Noting that Thailand had not granted licenses for importation of cigarettes during the past 
10 years, the Panel found that Thailand had acted inconsistently with Article XI:1.130 The Panel 
proceeded to examine whether Thai import measures affecting cigarettes were justified by Article 
XX(b). Agreeing to the parties and the expert from the WHO, the Panel accepted that smoking 
poses a serious threat to human health, thus enabling measures designed to reduce the consumption 
cigarettes to fall within the scope of Article XX(b). 131  The Panel found the “necessary” 
requirement to be a high bar, stating that the import restrictions could be considered to be 
“necessary” in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measures consistent with 
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the GATT, or less inconsistent with it.132 The Panel held that the Thai actions were not “necessary” 
within the meaning of Article XX(b) because Thailand could have employed various other GATT-
compatible means such as requiring greater disclosure of cigarettes’ composition, banning the use 
of certain additives, banning cigarette advertisements, controlling price and retail availability, and 
establishing uniform taxes that did not discriminate between imported and domestic cigarettes.133  
 
D. United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) [Tuna – Dolphin I] 
In 1972, the United States enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).134 In an 
attempt to reduce the incidental killing of dolphins, MMPA established a moratorium on the taking 
of dolphins by U.S. fishermen.135 MMPA turned out to be a modest success. In five years, dolphin 
mortality related to tuna harvesting decreased from 300,000 dolphin deaths per year to about 
25,000. 136  However, some U.S. fishermen sidestepped the MMPA by sailing under foreign 
flags.137 This prompted Congress to amend the MMPA to require foreign exporters of tuna to have 
comparable standards to their U.S. counterparts.138 On October 10, 1990, the United States, 
pursuant to court order, banned imports of tuna from Mexico.139 Adversely affected, Mexico 
requested the GATT Panel to find that the MMPA import prohibitions were in violation GATT 
Articles I, III, IX, XI and XIII.140 The United States contended that even if the MMPA measures 
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were otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT, they were justified under Article 
XX(b) or XX(g).141  
 The Panel concluded that the import restrictions were not internal regulation in accordance 
with Article III and were inconsistent with Article XI.142 With regard to the United States’ Article 
XX claims, the Panel expressed concern over the extra-jurisdictional nature of the MMPA 
measures.143 On Article XX(b), the Panel examined the drafting history of Article XX(b) to 
conclude that the drafters focused on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard plant or animal life 
within the jurisdiction of the importing country.144 The Panel’s finding with regard to Article XX(g) 
was similar: “A country can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible 
natural resource only to the extent that the production or consumption is under its jurisdiction.”145 
That is, no country may restrict imports in any manner for the purpose of protecting the 
environment outside its own jurisdiction.146 The clear pro-free trade message of the Panel upset 
environmental groups.147 
 The Panel’s “like product” analysis similarly delivered a huge blow to the 
environmentalists. The Panel focused solely on final products and not on processes and production 
methods. The Panel found that “[r]egulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the 
taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product.”148 This effectively declared that 
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differences in processes and production methods are not relevant in determining “likeness.”149 In 
other words, products produced in an environmentally unfriendly manner cannot be treated any 
less favorably than products produced in an environmentally friendly manner solely on the basis 
of the difference in the product’s process and production method.150     
 This Panel report was never adopted by the GATT Council due to the objection by the 
United States. Thus, while the report may provide some guidance, it does not have official legal 
status in the GATT.151  
 
E. United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994) [Tuna – Dolphin II] 
The United States continued to ban imports of tuna harvested in violation of the MMPA.152 
The European Economic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands brought a complaint against the 
U.S., alleging that the import ban constituted a quantitative restriction prohibited by GATT Article 
XI.153 The United States once again countered invoking exceptions under Articles XX(b) and 
XX(g).154  
Before Tuna – Dolphin II, the prevailing view was that the GATT would be strongly biased 
in favor of free trade, if it ever conflicts with environmental norms.155 However, the Panel in Tuna 
– Dolphin II case began to switch the preference a little.156  
The Panel accepted the view that “a policy to conserve dolphins was a policy to conserve 
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an exhaustible natural resource.”157 Thus, the Panel recognized that the U.S. efforts to protect 
dolphins were a valid policy. The Panel went further by rejecting the narrow interpretation of 
Article XX’s scope by Tuna – Dolphin I panel.158 Noting that the text of Article XX(b) does not 
specify any limitation on the location of the living things to be protected, and that the negotiating 
history of GATT does not clearly support Tuna – Dolphin I panel’s conclusion, the Panel reiterated 
the general international law that states do have the power to regulate “the conduct of their 
nationals with respect to persons, animals, plants and natural resources outside of their territory.”159 
Under the same logic, the provision of Article XX(g) does not necessarily apply only within the 
territory of the Member invoking it.160 Thus, Tuna – Dolphin II held that while Article XX 
exceptions allow a Member to pursue environmental goals outside the national territory, this 
extraterritorial application of environmental policies extend only to the Member’s nationals and 
vessels through personal jurisdiction.161  
Although the Tuna – Dolphin II Panel was more generous to environmental concerns than 
the Tuna – Dolphin I panel, it still did not embrace international environmental treaties in its 
analysis. The Panel stated that international environmental treaties were neither relevant as a 
primary means nor as a secondary means of interpretation of the GATT. 162  This sweeping 
approach practically rendered all international agreements existing outside of the GATT 
functionally incapable. 163  However, the Panel’s reasoning is inconsistent with the Vienna 
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Convention.164   
 As was the case in Tuna – Dolphin I, this panel report was never adopted due to the veto 
of the United States.165 
 
F. United States – Taxes on Automobiles (1994) 
In this case, three domestic measures maintained by the United States on automobiles were 
subject to complaints by the European Community. 166  First, under the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, the U.S. imposed “the luxury tax” on expensive vehicles selling above 
$30,000.167 Second, the Energy Tax Act applied “the gas guzzler tax” to the sale of relatively 
inefficient automobiles.168 Third, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, through the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy law (CAFE), required the average fuel economy for passenger cars sold 
in the United States not to fall below a certain threshold.169  
The European Community (EC) argued that all three regulations were inconsistent with 
Article III, and that they could not be justified under the exceptions of Article XX.170 With regard 
to the “luxury tax,” the Panel found that even though a large proportion of EC imports was affected 
by the measure, it did not mean the tax was aimed at affording protection to domestic automobiles 
selling for less than $30,000.171 Since expensive imported cars are not “like” cheaper domestic 
cars, the Panel found the luxury tax to be consistent with GATT Article III.172 
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On the issue of the “gas guzzler tax,” the EC contended that because all automobiles are 
like products, a difference in fuel economy is not sufficient to make one automobile unlike another 
for the purposes of Article III.173 Moreover, most automobiles subject to the tax were somehow 
of EC origin, the EC felt that the measure was targeted at EC automobiles.174 For example, in 
1990, “73.36 per cent of the total taxes paid were derived from European manufacturers, although 
European cars accounted for only 4 per cent of the US market. In contrast, US production 
accounted for only 19.91 per cent of total tax paid, although it accounted for 72 per cent of the US 
market.”175 Nevertheless, the Panel concluded that the gas guzzler tax was in compliance with 
Article III because there was no evidence that the aim or effect of the fuel economy threshold and 
of the regulatory distinctions changed conditions of competition affording protection to the 
American automobiles.176 In particular, the Panel noted that “the amount of the tax payable at the 
threshold did not seem excessive.”177 Some commentators criticize this finding as exercising a 
high level of “judicial restraint” that would likely limit the possibility of a national treatment 
violation to exceptional circumstances.178 
Concerning the CAFE regulation, the Panel noted that the U.S. separately calculated the 
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) of automobiles produced in the U.S., and that of imported 
automobiles.179 This allowed U.S. manufacturers which produce both low and high fuel-efficiency 
automobiles to average the two to achieve a high CAFE while foreign manufacturers which only 
produce low fuel-efficiency automobiles received a low CAFE and incurred more payment to the 
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U.S. government.180 Thus, the Panel ruled that the CAFE regulation was inconsistent with Article 
III.181  
Even though the United States argued that the inconsistency with Article III could be 
justified under Article XX(g) as a measure “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources,” the Panel concluded that the separate, and thus discriminatory calculation of CAFE 
between domestic and imported cars was not primarily aimed at the reduction of gasoline 
consumption and therefore could not be justified by Article XX(g).182 
 
Under GATT, panels slowly moved in the direction of accepting trade-restrictive 
environmental measures. Even from the very first environment case, the GATT Panel agreed with 
both Complainant and Respondent that tuna is an exhaustible natural resource. In other words, the 
GATT Panel recognized that the U.S. efforts to protect tuna were a valid policy. Nevertheless, 
GATT panels fell short of ruling in favor of environment. GATT panels also left a lot of room for 
improvement as they still refused to recognize international environmental treaties in its analysis, 
even as a secondary means of interpretation of the GATT.  
 
2. Under WTO 
 After the establishment of WTO and the Appellate Body to review panel reports, WTO 
moved further in the direction of embracing environmental measures. 
 
A. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (1996) 
                                           
180 Id. 
181 US – Automobiles, supra note 166, ¶ 6.1. 
182 Id. ¶¶ 5.60–5.61. 
28 
 
In an attempt to improve air quality in the midst of increasing pollution in population 
centers, the U.S. Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990, 183  effectively putting the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in charge of coming up with a new regulation on the 
composition of gasoline (Gasoline Rule).184 Now, sellers could only sell “reformulated” gasoline 
in nine large metropolitan areas with the worst ozone pollution and other designated areas while 
they could continue to sell the “conventional” gasoline in other parts of the United States.185 The 
Clean Air Act mandated that reformulated gasoline be free of heavy metals such as lead and 
manganese.186 With regard to conventional gasoline, the Act required it to be at least as clean as 
it was in 1990 (baseline standard). 187  EPA’s Gasoline further clarified how to establish the 
baseline standard. Most domestic producers could use one of three methods in establishing an 
individual baseline while most foreign refiners and importers had to use a “statutory baseline” EPA 
established.188    
Venezuela and Brazil claimed that the Gasoline Rule violates the national treatment 
provisions of GATT Article III and provisions of TBT Article 2.189 The U.S. argued that TBT 
Article 2 is irrelevant and the Gasoline Rule can be justified under the exceptions in Article XX.190  
The Panel concluded that the Gasoline Rule treated less favorably foreign gasoline, which 
was chemically identical to domestic gasoline by discriminatory methods of baseline 
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calculation.191 Moving on to an exceptions analysis under Article XX, the Panel agreed with the 
parties that a policy to reduce air pollution was a policy concerning the protection of human, animal 
and plant life or health within the meaning of Article XX(b).192 However, the Panel ruled that the 
U.S. measure failed the necessity test because there were reasonably available GATT-consistent or 
less inconsistent alternatives such as allowing foreign refiners to calculate individual baselines 
based on whatever foreign data available.193 The Panel also concluded that Article XX(d) could 
not save the United States because the Gasoline Rule was simply rules for determining individual 
baselines and did not constitute an enforcement mechanism.194 On Article XX(g), the Panel 
viewed clean air as a natural resource, which could be depleted.195 However, the U.S. measure 
failed the “primarily aimed at” test.196 In fact, the Panel stated that it found no link between less 
favorable treatment accorded to imported gasoline and the goal of clean air.197 In light of its 
findings under GATT, the Panel did not find it necessary to address Venezuela and Brazil’s 
argument under the TBT Agreement.198 
Claiming that the Panel erred in its finding that the rules on establishing baselines were not 
“related to” the conservation of clean air within the meaning of Article XX(g), the United States 
appealed to the Appellate Body.199 Completely reversing the Panel’s finding, the Appellate Body 
viewed that the baseline establishment rules as a whole were related to conserving clean air.200 
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Proceeding to determine whether the U.S. measure was made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption, the Appellate Body deemed it enough that the 
measure imposed restrictions to both domestic and imported gasoline.201 Unfortunately for the 
United States, however, the Appellate Body concluded that the Gasoline Rule did not comply with 
the chapeau of Article XX, which prohibits the application of an environmental measure in a 
manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction of 
international trade.202 In the Appellate Body’s view, the U.S. had alternative courses of action 
available to it such as 1) the imposition of the statutory baselines to both domestic and imported 
gasoline; or 2) the availability of individual baselines for all gasoline producers.203 Doing so 
would have eliminated all discrimination and no restriction on international trade would have been 
observed.204  
Therefore, the Appellate Body modified the Panel’s reasoning with regard to subsection (g) 
of Article XX, but ultimately reached the same conclusion that the U.S. Gasoline Rule could not 
be justified by invoking Article XX. However, it is important that the Appellate Body reiterated 
that “WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the 
environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the 
environmental legislation they enact and implement,” and that “that autonomy is circumscribed 
only by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered 
agreements”205 Also of significance is the fact that the Appellate Body seems to be advocating 
cooperative arrangements between the U.S. and foreign producers to reach the same result.206 
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Some scholars see it as a sign that the Appellate Body endorses that resort to multilateral solution 
to transboundary environmental problems through multilateral environmental agreements is 
preferable to unilateral solutions.207   
  
B. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (1998) [Shrimp 
– Turtle I] 
Building on US – Gasoline, the WTO Appellate Body further developed its environmental 
law doctrine in Shrimp – Turtle I and Shrimp – Turtle II.208  
In January 1997, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand requested the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body to establish a Panel to determine whether a U.S. import ban of shrimp and shrimp 
products pursuant to Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act is in violation of the WTO 
obligations.209 The U.S. legislation attempted to “level the playing field” between U.S. shrimpers 
who were subject to the costs of complying with U.S. environmental regulations and foreign 
shrimpers who were not.210 Also, the legislation pressured foreign governments to change their 
domestic regulations to protect endangered sea turtles from commercial shrimping practices, in 
order to sell shrimp products in the U.S. market.211 The commercial shrimp trawlers operating in 
sea turtle habitat were required to employ “turtle excluder devices,” known as TEDs.212 TEDs 
permit most sea turtles to escape from shrimp trawling nets before they are drowned.213 All 
countries in whose waters shrimp and sea turtles co-exist, had to be certified by the U.S. 
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Department of State as having and enforcing TED legislation on commercial shrimp trawlers, if 
they were to be able to export shrimp to the U.S.214 The case implicated the violation of equal 
treatment because the U.S. had special arrangements with some Caribbean countries due to a ruling 
by the U.S. Court of International Trade, but not with the Asian countries that were 
complainants. 215  More specifically, the United States gave western Atlantic and Caribbean 
countries three years to implement Section 609 requirements, but only allowed four months to 
other countries.216 
 The United States conceded that Section 609 amounted to an import restriction prohibited 
by Article XI, but tried to justify the measure regardless through Article XX.217 Departing from 
the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline, the Panel looked at the chapeau of Article XX before 
examining whether the measure at issue can be justified under subparagraphs of Article XX.218 In 
interpreting the chapeau of Article XX, the Panel noted that the WTO Preamble recognizes the 
importance of sustainable development, but concluded that environmental concerns were only 
secondary to the more central goals of trade liberalization and the elimination of trade barriers.219 
In this context, the Panel ruled that the U.S. measures fell beyond the scope of actions permitted 
under the chapeau of Article XX,220 and did not find it necessary to consider subparagraphs of 
Article XX.221 In addition, the Panel made a number of anti-environmental findings. First, even 
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though all the parties are all parties to CITES, do not contest the need to protect sea turtles, and 
referred to CITES, the Panel disregarded CITES as inapplicable stating that “CITES is about trade 
in endangered species and the subject of the US import prohibition (shrimp) is not the endangered 
species whose protection is sought through the import ban.”222 Second, with regard to unsolicited 
submissions from the Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for International 
Environmental Law, the Panel ruled that it could not accept such submissions, foreclosing the 
possibility of environmental groups to present their views.223 
  The United States appealed the Panel decision on both procedural and substantive 
grounds.224 Procedurally, the U.S. claimed that it was an error for the Panel to reject amicus curiae 
briefs submitted by NGOs.225 Broadly reading Article 13 of the DSU’s “right to seek information,” 
the Appellate Body deemed the amicus curiae briefs acceptable.226 Substantively, the U.S. argued 
that the Panel had erred in its analysis of Article XX.227 The Appellate Body reinstated the US – 
Gasoline Appellate Body’s two-tiered analysis of Article XX.228 Unlike what the Panel did, the 
appropriate method for applying Article XX first examines whether the measure at issue can be 
provisionally justified by a particular exception listed in paragraphs (a) to (j), before moving on to 
appraisal of the same measure under the chapeau of Article XX.229  
Thus, the Appellate Body turned to the first tier of the analysis of Section 609 under the 
terms of Article XX(g). The Appellate Body first concluded that sea turtles were exhaustible 
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natural resources.230 In interpreting the term “exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX(g), the 
Appellate Body acknowledged that the generic term is not “static” in its content or reference but 
is rather “by definition, evolutionary.”231 The Appellate Body found it pertinent to note that 
modern international conventions and declarations make frequent reference to natural resources as 
embracing both living and non-living resources.232 Here, the Appellate Body overturned the 
Panel’s decision to disregard CITES and adopted CITES as an interpretational tool to conclude 
that sea turtles were in fact an endangered species.233 Some observers have taken this part of the 
Appellate Body’s ruling to declare that the existence of an MEA protecting a certain endangered 
species could, prima facie, bring it within the Article XX exemption in the GATT as a legitimate 
environmental purpose.234 Next, the Appellate Body determined that the measure was “related to” 
the conservation of sea turtles.235 The measure passed the “primarily aimed at” test because the 
use of TEDs would be an effective tool for the preservation of sea turtles.236 Then, the Appellate 
Body found the measure to have been applied “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption” because the Endangered Species Act also requires all U.S. shrimpers 
to use approved TEDs.237  
The Appellate Body concluded that while the U.S. measure was provisionally justified 
under Article XX(g), it did not meet the conditions set out in the chapeau of Article XX.238 
Specifically, the Appellate Body condemned the United States for failing to conduct bilateral or 
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multilateral negotiations with affected countries to reach a cooperative multilateral solution.239 
That the United States seriously negotiated with some countries to produce the Inter-American 
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, but not with others constituted 
unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX. 240  Also, the 
Appellate Body found that the U.S. measures were too rigid and inflexible to the point of denying 
basic fairness and due process and constituting “arbitrary discrimination” within the meaning of 
the chapeau.241  
The Appellate Body decision is not necessarily a loss for environmentalists because it 
ruled that environmental measures are no longer per se inconsistent with the objectives of the 
GATT/WTO regime.242 The Appellate Body elaborated that even the use of extra-jurisdictional 
measures may be justified as long as there is a “sufficient nexus between the migratory and 
endangered marine populations involved and the United States for the purposes of Article 
XX(g).” 243  Furthermore, although the Appellate Body found the manner in which the U.S. 
measure was applied to be unjustifiable because the measure was a rigid extraterritorial extension 
of U.S. law to other countries, and it wholly disregarded the conditions prevailing in other countries, 
the Appellate Body still determined that the means are reasonably related to the ends in that the 
Section 609 was not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to its policy 
objective.244  
 
C. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to 
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Article 21.5 of the DSU (2001) [Shrimp – Turtle II] 
Despite the Appellate Body ruling in Shrimp – Turtle I, the United States continued to 
maintain its commitment to sea turtle preservation.245 Instead of changing its applicable law, it 
changed the manner in which it applied the law. That is, it began to recognize sea turtle-protective 
measures that are “comparable in effect” to those of the United States.246  
Pursuant to the Shrimp – Turtle I ruling, the U.S. issued Revised Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Section 609 (“Revised Guidelines”) in 1999.247 Under the Revised Guidelines, 
the import prohibitions no longer apply to shrimp harvested using TEDs comparable in 
effectiveness to those required by the U.S. or shrimp harvested in any other manner that does not 
pose a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles.248  
Nonetheless, taking the case before DSU (Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes) Article 21.5 Panel, Malaysia argued that the steps taken by 
the U.S. did not remove the elements of “unjustifiable discrimination” and “arbitrary 
discrimination.”249 Malaysia also argued that Shrimp – Turtle I ruling imposed on the United 
States a duty to negotiate an agreement with shrimp exporting countries, but failed to do so.250 
The United States countered that it made reasonable efforts to negotiate an agreement and did 
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modify the guidelines to comply with Shrimp – Turtle I ruling.251 
The Shrimp – Turtle II Panel noted that the United States did not amend Section 609, but 
rather issued revised implementing guidelines.252 Therefore, the Panel concluded that the findings 
of the Shrimp – Turtle I Appellate Body that Section 609 is provisionally justified under Article 
XX(g) remained valid.253 Moving on to the interpretation of the chapeau, the Panel concluded that 
while the U.S. did not have the obligation to conclude an agreement in order to comply with Article 
XX, it had an obligation to make serious good faith efforts to reach an agreement before resorting 
to a unilateral measure.254 Subsequently, the Panel found that the U.S. efforts since 1998 met the 
standard255 because it 1) communicated with four original complainants to explore a regional 
convention for the conservation of sea turtles; 2) held a symposium on sea turtle conservation; and 
3) organized a conference to develop an international agreement.256 On the issue of the insufficient 
flexibility of the measure, the Panel now found it sufficiently flexible that the United States no 
longer required the exporting countries’ programs to be essentially the same as the U.S. program 
and that the U.S. acknowledged that other programs may be comparable.257 This finding, coupled 
with the United States’ offering of technical assistance to develop the use of TEDs in third countries, 
led the Panel to conclude that Section 609 is not applied so as to constitute a disguised restriction 
on trade.258  
Malaysia challenged the Panel’s decision on the ground that the Panel erroneously 
confused an obligation to conclude an international agreement with a mere obligation to 
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negotiate.259 Malaysia also disagreed that the Revised Guidelines are sufficiently flexible.260 The 
Shrimp – Turtle II Appellate Body upheld the Revised Guidelines as sufficiently flexible to meet 
the standards of the chapeau.261 Like the Panel, the Appellate Body found it dispositive that the 
new measure took into account special circumstances in the exporting country and offered to 
provide the necessary assistance to affected countries.262 On the issue of the obligation to pursue 
negotiations, the Appellate Body again found for the United States. 263  The Appellate Body 
reaffirmed that there is no obligation to conclude an agreement, and that showing serious efforts 
in good faith to negotiate is sufficient.264  
 
D. EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (2001) 
In 1996, France banned, with limited exceptions, the processing, sale, import, and other 
uses of asbestos in order to protect workers and consumers.265 Adversely affected by the import 
ban, Canada brought a complaint before the WTO Panel. Mainly, Canada claimed that the import 
ban is incompatible with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the national treatment 
obligation in GATT Article III, and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Article XI.266 
The European Communities, representing France, contended that the TBT Agreement is not 
applicable and that the ban can be justified as a measure necessary to protect human health within 
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the meaning of Article XX(b).267  
First, the Panel found that the asbestos ban was not governed by the TBT Agreement 
because the ban is not a “technical regulation” within the meaning of that agreement.268 With 
respect to GATT Article III, the Panel engaged in the analysis of “likeness.” Considering that it is 
not relevant to take into account “risk”269 and “consumer tastes and habits” in the like product 
analysis, 270  the Panel determined that non-asbestos alternatives to asbestos and asbestos-
containing products are “like products” within the meaning of Article III.271 Then, since the 
measure does not place an identical ban on “like products,” the Panel concluded the existence of 
de jure discrimination in violation of Article III’s national treatment obligation.272 However, the 
Panel concluded that the French measure was justified under the chapeau and paragraph (b) of 
Article XX.273 The Panel noted that a policy that seeks to reduce exposure to a risk is a policy 
designed to protect human life or health.274 Facing daunting scientific evidence that exposure to 
asbestos can cause serious illness, including lung cancer, mesothelioma, and asbestosis, the Panel 
concluded that the French policy of prohibiting asbestos fell within the meaning of Article 
XX(b).275 Following the well-established “necessity” test promulgated in Thailand – Cigarettes, 
which calls for no alternative measure consistent or less inconsistent with GATT,276 the Panel was 
satisfied that there was no reasonably available alternative to banning asbestos.277 Under the 
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chapeau of Article XX, the Panel deemed that the EC established that the French measure does not 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because the measure applies equally to asbestos 
products originating in any country, including France.278 Emulating the Appellate Body in US – 
Gasoline, the Panel noted that the French measure was publicly announced and that it was applied 
unequivocally to international trade, leading to the conclusion that the measure did not constitute 
a disguised restriction on international trade.279  
 Environmentalists immediately shot down the Panel ruling as a case that “effectively 
demonstrates the limits of the WTO’s dispute resolution system.”280 While they welcomed the 
Panel ruling as the first health-based trade ban to be upheld in the GATT/WTO, they found the 
free-trade obsessed Panel’s logic to be toxic.281 In particular, it was hard to follow how the Panel 
maintained that non-asbestos alternatives to asbestos and asbestos-containing products are “like 
products.”282 Although France ultimately prevailed, thanks to the overwhelming evidence of 
asbestos toxicity,283 the environmentalists remained skeptical as to the use of the WTO dispute 
settlement system as the forum for adjudicating trade-environment conflicts. Yet, for them, the 
Appellate Body’s report should be more comforting. 
 Canada appealed with respect to the Panel’s interpretation of the TBT Agreement and the 
Article XX exception.284 The EC cross-appealed as to the Article III national treatment.285 First, 
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with regard to the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s interpretation that the 
challenged measure did not establish technical standards for a product. 286  Nevertheless, the 
Appellate Body found it impossible to engage in the analysis of the TBT Agreement because the 
Panel failed to develop sufficient facts.287 Notably, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s much 
criticized ruling on GATT Article III. The Appellate Body first reproached the Panel for not 
evaluating “all of the relevant evidence.” 288  Considering carcinogenicity or toxicity to be a 
defining aspect of the physical properties,289 the Appellate Body concluded that alternatives that 
do not contain asbestos are not “like products.”290 The Appellate Body added that a mere finding 
that a product is “like” another does not suffice to establish an inconsistency with Article III as 
there must also be less favorable treatment of imported products.291 Lastly, on Canada’s claims 
on Article XX, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the measure is “necessary to 
protect human … life or health.”292 In the process, the Appellate Body engaged in a balancing test 
in analyzing the word “necessary” in Article XX(b).293 The more compelling the values promoted 
by the government, the more the measure can be trade-restrictive.294  
 While the Panel report attracted severe criticisms from environmental organizations, some 
commentators praised the Appellate Body for “acting with judicial caution” and for “giving itself 
ample room to craft a balance between internal and external legitimacy.”295  
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3. Aftermath 
So, did the Shrimp – Turtle I & II solve the WTO-MEA conflict? Some say it did because 
the Appellate Body stated that bona fide trade restrictions in MEA will be upheld.296 In declaring 
so, the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. did not seem to detain the Appellate Body. Instead, the 
Appellate Body mentioned that “it is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting 
countries, compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies prescribed by the importing country, 
renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX.”297 This ruling implies that 
requiring other WTO Members to adopt a comparable regulatory program may not be inconsistent 
per se with the WTO obligation, if serious efforts were made to reach an international agreement 
with states whose WTO rights might be affected by an environment policy measure. This 
represents a fundamental shift in the WTO jurisprudence. On the other hand, some commentators 
were not as optimistic. In their minds, the Shrimp – Turtle I ruling failed to clarify how a WTO 
Member may act unilaterally to protect an endangered species.298 They find it troubling that the 
Appellate Body would see the United States’ failure to seek multilateral solutions as an important 
factor in determining Section 609 unjustifiably discriminatory.299 Critics point that nothing in 
Article XX requires multilateral effort,300 or reflects due process.301 
It cannot be denied that the Appellate Body in Shrimp – Turtle I & II has provided a much 
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more generous interpretation of the environmental exemptions in the WTO rules. However, the 
trade-environment tensions have not been resolved by this decision. Certain limits still remain in 
the WTO. First, the WTO members may still challenge trade restrictive measures in MEAs as 
Shrimp – Turtle I was not a direct clash between the WTO and an MEA. As the membership and 
scope of WTO expand, along with the number of MEAs, the probability of legal challenge in the 
WTO will inevitably increase. Second, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism still remains the 
dominant avenue for the resolution of trade and environmental conflicts. Rather than leaving it to 
the parties to MEAs to waive trade rules for the sake of global environmental protection, the WTO 
may judge trade restrictions in the MEAs. This means the party which wishes to invoke 
environmental exemption bears the burden of proof. The party must show that its measure is 
necessary and that it is the least trade restrictive means. This is a difficult standard to meet.  
 Nevertheless, it should be noted how the Appellate Body reiterated the importance of 
concerted efforts at tackling the environmental issues, before bringing a case to the WTO dispute 
settlement system.302 Currently existing MEAs have been directly referred to, as the basis for 
interpretation of “exhaustible natural resources” of Article XX(g), on the grounds that the 
meanings of the WTO texts are not fixed but are evolving.303  
 
 Compared to GATT panels, WTO panels and appellate body proved much more hospitable 
to environmental concerns. A unilateral environmental measure by the U.S. and another one by 
France even prevailed under the WTO. WTO appellate body not only looked to MEAs for guidance, 
but it in fact cited to some. Nonetheless, it remains true that none of the GATT/WTO cases have 
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dealt with a direct provision of an MEA. What is a feasible way of harmonizing a potential WTO-
MEA clash?  
 
IV. HARMONIZATION OF ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 
1. Outside the WTO Framework 
The current clash between the free trade regime and the environmental regime is not a 
question about putting priority at either economic or environmental interests. The two regimes are 
in different stages of maturation.304 That is, they have unequal interests in solving the disputes at 
the moment. The WTO has the most highly judicialized dispute settlement system, whereas MEAs 
are relatively poorly coordinated and integrated, without one institutional basis.305 The MEAs do 
not share commonalities in leading principles, compliance, dispute settlement procedures, 
monitoring and reporting requirements, and so on.306 This is why the environment-trade clash 
cannot be simply solved by changes in the rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The 
dispute settlement of MEAs and WTO differ vastly in their approaches to resolving the legal 
conflicts arising within their regimes.307 Not only that, the ways of dispute settlement differ among 
MEAs.308 
 As mentioned above, the WTO plays the central role in setting the norms, principles and 
procedures for the trade regime. But there is no such centralization within the environmental 
regimes, since MEAs have separate organizational bases.309 There is no general agreement that 
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sets the norm on principles, procedure and rules in environmental policy-making. 310 
Organizations like the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), and Environment for Europe Program 
have tried to build some commonalities.311 However, they lag far behind the WTO.312  
At the global level, there have been discussions about the Global Environmental 
Organization (“GEO”).313 If there is one organizational forum for all MEAs, then not only can the 
diverse regimes and agreements be coordinated, but also can the power of WTO be 
counterbalanced.314 Daniel Esty originally leaned towards a GEO, but more recently he has been 
arguing for a restructuring of WTO as the most strategic and feasible option.315 In fact, major 
structural reform or integration between environment and trade is not much of a possibility.316 
Rather, harmonizing the various environmental regimes seems more feasible at the moment.317 
The maturation of environmental regimes has resulted in their growing power and influence vis-
à-vis trade, and it is most likely that this trend will continue for some time.318 Although there are 
many differences among MEAs, the MEAs also have many common grounds. For example, MEAs 
often ask member states—even developing ones—to develop and improve scientific and 
administrative knowledge regarding the environment.319 If a single organization is responsible for 
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carrying forward various environmental agendas, it can have more influence by merging fragments 
of information. 320  The WTO has been reluctant to expand its mandate to encompass 
environmental issues.321 Thus, some view that the Global Environmental Organization should be 
formed to play an active role in this arena.322 
However, introducing the GEO will likely lead to the following problems:323 
First, today’s environmental problems include everything from climate change, ozone 
depletion, endangered species and air pollution to biodiversity, water pollution and disforestation. 
In addition, environmental problems are not isolated issues but are closely linked to other areas 
such as trade, development and investment. Therefore, the notion that one big international 
organization can deal with all these problems risks being an abstract concept in a vacuum.  
Second, many existing international organizations including the WTO are already 
handling the conflict between trade and environment. 324  This means adding one more 
international organization may just put in place yet another bureaucratic organization, simply 
complicating the matter.  
Third, new norms developed by the GEO may actually fall below the level of current 
environmental norms created by different MEAs. This may occur because in order to have a critical 
mass of countries to agree on a rule, the GEO will have to concede in key areas whereas each 
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individual MEA may more ambitiously push for environmental protection.  
Fourth, one particular problem is that not all WTO Members will join the GEO. Many 
developing countries still suspect that there are protectionist interests behind trade measures citing 
the environment as a reason. If the GEO ends up with only developed countries, then it will be 
impossible to resolve the WTO-MEA divide. 
Fifth, introduction of the GEO may increase forum shopping behavior. Developed 
countries will likely prefer GEO while developing countries will pick WTO as the forum that better 
reflect their interests. 
 Thus, in order to resolve the regime clash in a relatively clear and cost-saving manner, 
letting the WTO handle environmental issues is more desirable. Even though critics argue that the 
WTO’s original purpose is to promote free trade, the WTO’s mandate has significantly expanded 
since the inception of GATT in 1948.325 The GATT originally regulated trade in goods, but the 
WTO has expanded to regulate services, intellectual property, subsidies, etc. The GATT 1947 has 
been amended to recognize environmental issues, WTO’s dispute settlement system has 
adjudicated a number of environment-related trade disputes, and the WTO created the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (“CTE”) to identify and understand the relationship between trade and 
the environment in order to promote sustainable development.326 Consequently, it is narrow-
minded to consider the WTO unfit to handle environmental matters just because it was originally 
created only for free trade in commodities.  
 Moreover, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, selecting the WTO as a forum is an 
outstanding choice. The WTO already exists, requiring no additional cost for set up. WTO is 
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constantly adding members to its already comprehensive list, and it has a very well respected 
dispute settlement system that members do comply with. However, the GEO, even if established, 
will not likely be as successful because it will not be able to provide tangible benefits right away.327    
 In conclusion, the MEA-WTO regime clash should be handled within the WTO 
framework. 
 
2. Within the WTO Framework 
 At least up to this point, there has been no actual clash between the WTO and an MEA.328 
This allows some scholars to claim that there is no need to waste resources on and worry about a 
hypothetical, non-existent problem.329 In fact, many countries supported this view in a CTE 
meeting. 330  Brazil, China and India refute EU’s argument that it is necessary to verify the 
relationship between MEAs and the WTO.331 They further argue that the WTO and MEAs are 
already mutually recognizing one another, given no dispute has arisen from a specific trade 
provision of an MEA.332 In addition, Argentina pointed out that restricting trade is only one of 
many measures MEAs adopt and that merely about 20 out of more than 200 MEAs have trade-
related measures.333  
However, notwithstanding these obstacles, trade-environment linkage is important for the 
foregoing reasons. First, the conspicuous legal imbalance between MEAs and WTO makes such 
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linkage inevitable. Second, WTO’s expanding mandate means incorporating one more area is not 
an insurmountable hurdle. Third, taking advantage of the WTO’s strong legalism is both efficient 
and effective. 
 
A. Legal Imbalance 
The WTO system is virtually unique in international law, with its combination of 
compulsory jurisdiction, legally binding results, and sanctions for non-compliance.334 In case of 
a dispute, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) encourages Members to enter into informal 
negotiations in an effort to reach a mutually agreeable solution.335 The party claiming a violation 
of a provision of the WTO Agreement must assert and prove its claim.336 In turn, the party 
invoking in defense a provision that is an exception to the allegedly violated obligation bears the 
burden of proof that the conditions set out in the exception are met.337 Panel reports are adopted 
within sixty days of their issuance, except when a Member initiates an appeal or when the other 
Members form a consensus not to adopt the report. 338  If a Member ignores the Panel’s 
recommendations, the complaining Member may seek compensation, either in the area of trade 
directly related to the dispute or in another trade sector if necessary.339 
In contrast, the international environmental regime lags far behind the WTO system.340 
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Unlike the WTO DSB that almost exclusively relies on adjudication, MEAs use different tools.341 
First, MEAs typically focus on dispute avoidance rather than dispute settlement.342 They use 
“sunshine” methods, such as reporting, monitoring, on-site visits, and transparency to induce 
compliance. 343  MEAs also use positive incentives, such as financial or technical assistance, 
training programs and access to technology.344 Second, after disputes arise, MEAs tend to rely on 
cooperative and facilitative means, rather than coercive means, to induce treaty compliance.345 
Among the multilateral environmental treaties concluded after World War II, more than half of the 
treaties do not provide for institutions for dispute settlement at all. 346  On the other hand, 
supplementary texts show more stringent dispute settlement procedures as compared to main treaty 
texts, more than a half of them having binding arbitration.347  
 The WTO mandate is also expanding.348 The realm of WTO has evolved from trade in 
goods, to trade in services, intellectual property rights, and even government procurement 
policies.349 Similarly, MEAs are developing trade measures that are increasing in amount and 
types. For example, the Biodiversity Convention will likely develop rules relating to intellectual 
property rights.350 Therefore, a clarification of the relationship is necessary before a way for 
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collaboration and reinforcement between WTO and MEA objectives can be found.  
The legal imbalance between WTO and MEAs is significant. The compulsory dispute 
settlement system for breach of WTO norms may provide an incentive for states to comply with 
the WTO norm, rather than the MEA norm.351 In other words, there are two main ways in which 
MEA-WTO conflict can arise. First, it can arise through a specific conflict between the rules. 
Second, it can also arise simply from the fact that WTO is so much stronger than MEAs. This 
second avenue explains why it is desirable to take advantage of the superior WTO legal system 
and handle the MEA-WTO conflict within the WTO framework. 
 
B. Evolution of Interpretation of Article XX 
The WTO treaty does not include a general conflict clause setting out its relationship with 
other norms of international law.352 However, the WTO provides some limited guidance on how 
to resolve conflict between the WTO and MEAs.353 First, the WTO created CTE, which endorsed 
“multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best and most 
effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary or global 
nature.”354 Second, the WTO’s preamble calls for “the optimal use of the world’s resources . . . 
seeking . . . to protect and preserve the environment.”355 
Pointing out that the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited, but the applicable law before 
them is not, Joost Pauwelyn suggests that sometimes non-WTO rules can be part of the applicable 
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law before WTO panels.356 However, Pauwelyn cautions that non-WTO rules should only be 
applicable when the disputing parties have all accepted those rules in the first place. 357 For 
example, in Shrimp – Turtle I & II, instead of simply referring to MEAs, Pauwelyn’s approach 
would actually apply such MEAs.358 More specifically, if the U.S. entered into an international 
agreement with complaining countries, the U.S. would be able to use the non-WTO treaty as a 
defense against a claim of WTO violation.359 Thus, at least in some situations, under the current 
system, certain trade-restrictive environmental measures may prevail. In fact, Pauwelyn argues 
that there is no need to expand the mandate of the WTO to take into account other non-trade 
concerns.360  
Unfortunately, Pauwelyn’s approach arguably fails when some of the WTO Members do 
not embrace MEAs. In the Shrimp – Turtle context, if India, one of the complainants, does not 
agree to the U.S.-led agreement, reference to the non-WTO rule would be off the table. 361 
Therefore, in many instances, GATT Article XX is still relevant unlike Pauwelyn’s suggestion to 
the contrary. GATT Article XX comes in when an MEA imposes an obligation on a party to restrict 
trade with a non-party. When both the party and the non-party are WTO Members, the trade 
restriction goes against WTO rules. Certainly, the party to the MEA cannot invoke the MEA as a 
legal justification for the breach of the WTO rule because the non-party cannot be held by the 
provisions of the MEA.362 However, the party could still justify its action under exceptions 
provided by GATT Article XX.363  
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A Panel is called upon to assess whether a particular Member’s action in compliance with 
a MEA constitutes a violation of MFN, NT, Quantitative Restriction, or other WTO obligations. A 
Panel may also offer its interpretation of the applicability of the Article XX exceptions. In 
particular, a Panel report could clarify the “arbitrary and unjustified discrimination” standard in 
the chapeau of Article XX and the “necessary” and “primarily aimed at conservation” standards of 
Articles XX(b) and (g). Evolving interpretation of Article XX exceptions may allow widely 
accepted MEAs to restrict trade for environment.364  
 In the Shrimp – Turtle I case, the Appellate Body referred to several MEAs when 
interpreting the term “exhaustible natural resources.”365 This referral effectively left countries 
room for adopting trade-related environmental measures and acknowledged that multilateral 
measures are superior to unilateral measures.366 In the Shrimp – Turtle II case, the existence of an 
MEA was used to help determine whether an import ban was arbitrary or discriminatory. Here, the 
Panel stated: “… [a] Member may legitimately require, as a condition of access of certain products 
to its market, that exporting countries commit themselves to a regulatory program deemed 
comparable to its own.”367 The logic of this statement, which was reaffirmed by the Appellate 
Body, would appear to allow considerable scope for trade-related environmental measures, 
including MEA trade measures. The decision of Shrimp – Turtle II case, therefore, suggests that 
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we can fully achieve environmental protection while retaining the current GATT regime.  
 But it is politically important to find an effective clarification about MEAs specifically in 
Article XX. Despite the important rulings on Article XX, there is no doctrine of stare decisis in 
WTO.368 This would mean that the Appellate Body may move to another direction in the future. 
It should be said that there is a lack of coherence and predictability with regard to trade measures 
in MEAs. Article XX does not explicitly distinguish between measures taken to address 
environmental impacts within or outside the territory of a WTO Member. Moreover, Articles XX 
(b) and (g) are simply not enough. For example, do we know if ozone layers count as “exhaustible 
natural resources?” 
 In addition, developing countries do not like the idea of expanding the scope of Article 
XX exceptions to allow trade-restricting environmental measurers.369 They feel that they are 
entitled to pollute because developed countries were able to pollute in the course of their 
development.370 Moreover, even if the Appellate Body in the Shrimp – Turtle case took more 
affirmative stance on multilateral, trade-restricting environmental measures, it did not explicitly 
verify the relationship between MEAs and the WTO.371 Since the WTO has traditionally been 
very passive in acknowledging non-trade values, it is still unclear whether trade restrictions of 
MEAs will be accepted.372 
 Lastly, this method relies on WTO panel decisions instead of talks between Members. 
Switzerland, Canada, Japan and the EU expressed that the WTO-MEA clash should not be up to 
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WTO panel decisions.373  
 
C. Waiver? 
 The potential adoption of a waiver has often been discussed as a means to clarify the 
relationship between MEAs and the WTO.374 A waiver would be granted to allow derogations 
from WTO obligations when applying measures of MEAs.375 A waiver may be specifically aimed 
at a certain agreement. To secure a waiver for the MEAs, a Member must demonstrate “exceptional 
circumstances” and generally obtain three-fourths of the Members’ support.376 Request for a 
waiver is to be submitted to the Ministerial Conference and to be decided upon by consensus within 
90 days. If the request is not considered within 90 days, three-fourths of the Members’ support will 
be required.377 Waivers must state the terms and conditions governing their application and the 
specific date of termination. All waivers, regardless of length of time, are to be reviewed annually 
by the Ministerial Conference.378 
 Leading scholars in the field such as John Jackson, the main architect of the WTO, contend 
that adopting waivers for specific, widely applied MEAs can be a desirable short-term solution.379 
This is a persuasive option because waivers enable the resolution of the MEA-WTO clash within 
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the existing WTO framework.380 In fact, The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
employed this option, and its text includes waivers for various MEAs. 
 Waivers have mainly two advantages.381 First, since WTO Members will deal with each 
waiver after the fact, that is after each problem arises, there will be concrete validity.382 No 
standard can account for every single situation and thus amending the GATT provisions before the 
fact poses a unique challenge. However, with the adoption of waivers, there is no need for this. 
Second, having three-fourths of the Members’ support establishes true respect for the particular 
MEA at issue.383 
 Nevertheless, this option is not without shortcomings.384 One shortcoming of the waiver 
option is the cumbersome procedural hurdles.385 Moreover, a waiver will be viewed by non-parties 
to an MEA as a de facto acceptance of the MEA.386 If the waiver applies only to certain MEAs, 
there are no assurances for future MEAs to be protected by waiver.387 Further, criteria involved in 
deciding the appropriateness of a waiver may differ from case to case.388 This uncertainty creates 
an atmosphere of unpredictability. The text of GATT Article IX ambiguously stipulates that 
waivers can be granted in “exceptional circumstances.”389 This standard itself is very ambiguous 
and can easily lead to confusions.  
 In fact, WTO has in the past tried to reconcile conflicting international norms through 
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waivers.390 One prime example is the TRIPS waiver applicable to developing and least developed 
countries. As the initial ten-year transitional period was to expire on January 1, 2005, the 
limitations TRIPS would pose on access to essential medicines drew much attention and 
criticism.391 Much debate centered on the tension between the promotion of public health on the 
one hand and the protection of intellectual property rights on the other hand.392 The problem was 
exacerbated in developing and least-developed countries due to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, 
and other epidemics.393 After long and controversial discussions, WTO Members, in August, 2003, 
adopted a waiver that mitigates the tension between patent obligations and the human right to 
health care by modifying certain legal rules of the TRIPS Agreement.394 The TRIPS waiver shows 
that it is possible to achieve some norm change in favor of public health within the WTO.395 
 Moreover, history shows that a successful waiver can be a stepping stone for a permanent 
norm change. The idea for giving preferences to developing countries in spite of the MFN principle 
emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) in 
1964.396 Subsequent negotiations at UNCTAD resulted in “unanimous agreement” in favor of the 
establishment of preferential arrangements.397 GATT Contracting Parties reacted positively with 
a waiver for preferential tariff schemes in 1971.398 As with other waivers, this waiver was to expire 
after ten years, but GATT Contracting Parties permanently enshrined this waiver in the 1979 GATT 
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Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, commonly known as the “Enabling Clause.”399 The Enabling Clause is 
now an integral part of the WTO.400 The history of the Enabling Clause is a good example of non-
traditional trade values at work. While the classical liberal economic view sees the global economy 
more or less working through the invisible hand power of markets,401 an alternative view of the 
global economy sees it as having been structured by colonialism,402 and thus is also concerned 
about equality. The theory underpinning the waiver leading to the Enabling Clause is based on this 
alternative view. Thus, WTO, if not the predecessor GATT, is not only interested in a specific 
economic outlook, but also in social justice.  
  
D. Amending the GATT 1994 
It takes two-thirds of the WTO Members to amend various WTO Agreements. Currently, 
that means 108 of the total 162 Members.403 At first appearance, amending the text of GATT does 
not seem more challenging than the adoption of waivers because the latter requires three-fourths 
of the Members on board.404 Conversely, the aftermath of the 2003 TRIPS waiver may suggest 
the difficulty of making a permanent change to the WTO Agreements. In December 2005, WTO 
Members approved changes to the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement making the 2003 waiver 
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permanent.405 As of May 2016, the required two thirds have not accepted the amendment.406 
However, the WTO is finally close to achieving the first ever amendment to its rules as only eleven 
more acceptances are needed to reach 108,407 signaling that amendments are indeed a possible 
avenue for addressing the MEA-WTO conflict.  
Also, some commentators view that amending the GATT provisions is the only real 
solution, which will eventually come through as developing and developed countries make mutual 
concessions.408 Given the cost of setting up the GEO or any other new forum, utilizing the already 
existing WTO is desirable.409 Particularly, the WTO provides its Members regular negotiation 
sessions through continuous “rounds.” Therefore, I believe amending the GATT 1994 is the best 
approach. There are two main approaches to amending the GATT: 
  
i. MEA-Specific Exemption 
 First, through the MEA-specific exemption, GATT can list specific MEAs to which the 
WTO will afford special exceptions. This is the approach taken by NAFTA Article 104. NAFTA 
lists major MEAs such as CITES, Montreal Protocol, and Basel Convention.410 NAFTA stipulates 
that in the event of any inconsistency between NAFTA and the listed MEAs, trade obligations 
specified in the MEAs will prevail.411 Here, NAFTA left some room for further amendment as 
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new MEAs can be added in the future.412  
 
ii. Criteria-Specific Exemption 
 Second, through the criteria-specific exemption, the WTO will afford exceptions to MEAs 
that meet some specifically identified criteria. There is no longer the need to list specific MEAs. 
This allows for a broad range of exceptions and more flexible interpretation and application of 
such exceptions.  
 The criteria-specific approach is better suited to address the regime clash. In terms of 
practicality, coming up with a list of MEAs all the WTO Members can agree on is a big challenge. 
Moreover, regional MEAs or MEAs with a small membership base will likely be left out under the 
MEA-specific approach.  
 
  iii. Amendment to Article XX 
 In amending the GATT 1994, adding a new paragraph to Article XX exceptions is the best 
and most feasible option.413 It is also a constructive way of changing the WTO perspective.414 In 
fact, the European Union has argued before the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment 
that Article XX should be amended to allow for the recognition that WTO should permit certain 
trade-restrictive measures if such measures are allowed under MEAs.415 Given that WTO DSB 
has not addressed the question of what happens when a WTO rule and a MEA rule directly conflict, 
an amendment to Article XX would be a clear way to protect environmental values enshrined in 
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the MEAs.416 It is also noteworthy that the UNEP, the premier international agency in international 
environmental law, is focusing on improving enforcement mechanisms in the existing 
environmental regime, leaving the amendment strategy as a feasible, short-term answer until the 
environmental regime gets teeth.417  In addition, the amendment strategy ensures the desired 
flexibility by not imposing “any affirmative obligations on governments to adopt […] 
environmental protections.”418 
A new paragraph would automatically fall under the requirements in the chapeau such as 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction on international trade.” 
Thanks to the clarification given by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp – Turtle I case, it is relatively 
clear that future panels will apply the so-called two-tiered analysis.419  
 With this in mind, my proposal for a new paragraph is as follows: 
 “in multilateral environmental agreements.” 
 
The amendment could have stated, “relating to multilateral environmental agreements.” 
The “relating to” language would have been too broad to garner enough support among 
developing-country Members because it would have enabled unilateral measures somehow related 
to the goals of the MEAs. Conversely, the current “in multilateral environmental agreements” 
language is more narrowly drawn and more conservative. This kind of provision does not 
necessarily undermine the goals of the trading system. This is especially true because many of the 
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same WTO members are parties to various MEAs. MEAs are usually open to accession of all 
interested states. When MEAs adopt trade restrictions, such measures are reasonably related to the 
problem dealt with and conform to international norms and customs. MEAs also seek to address 
serious environmental harms of both regional and global scope.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The conflict of MEAs and WTO is a question of whether the trade-related provisions in 
the MEAs should be governed by the WTO when brought to the WTO dispute settlement system 
by a Member of the WTO. As of yet, there has not been any case of dispute resolution directly 
concerning specific trade obligations of MEAs before the WTO Panel. Nevertheless, the issue has 
become a matter of great concern for decades. The potential for WTO-MEA conflict abounds. 
MEAs make use of trade restrictions for purposes other than directly prohibiting the trade of 
environmentally harmful products, including measures creating incentives for non-parties to 
participate and measures aimed to discourage free riders. Potential inconsistencies between MEA 
provisions and the WTO rules can occur in relation to the MFN, NT, Quantitative Restrictions and 
Article XX.  
In the Shrimp – Turtle case, after an examination of whether the domestic U.S. law 
legislated for the protection of turtles was consistent to the WTO obligations, the Appellate Body 
ruled that there is no per se rule of impermissibility in the text of Article XX. This opened the door 
for MEAs, since even the unilateral environmental measures protecting certain endangered species 
could prima facie be legitimized as exception under Article XX. There is no doubt that the 
Appellate Body ruling of the Shrimp – Turtle case has provided a much more generous 
interpretation of the environmental exemptions in the WTO rules. However, the limits of this ruling 
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are that the probability of WTO-MEA conflicts will increase as the WTO expands in scope, and 
that the WTO dispute settlement process still remains the dominant mechanism.  
Most of the cases raised before the GATT/WTO Panels, which were related to 
environmental protection, have more often than not suffered from criticisms. The 
environmentalists perceive the WTO as forsaking environmental interests for the sake of protecting 
the free trade. The WTO is fully aware of the nexus between trade and environment. This is 
evidenced in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, which refers to the concept of sustainable 
development. But from the perspective of the environmentalists, the WTO’s initiatives for 
protecting the environment are only meager and unsatisfactory. Many suggestions have been made 
to this date, for ways to resolve this potential conflict within the WTO, such as broadening the 
interpretation of Article XX, revising the WTO provisions, or extending and utilizing the waiver 
clause.  
The Appellate Body in the Shrimp – Turtle cases mentioned that it must consider not only 
scientific evidence in case of environmental disputes, but also relevant principles and norms from 
international environmental law and policy, when interpreting the provisions of the WTO 
Agreements. That is, environmental values and interests are to be considered within the WTO. 
However, the MEA regime differs from the trade regime, in that it has not yet reached consensus 
on environmental norms and principles, due to its dispersed and decentralized nature. In this sense, 
the formation of a global environmental institution has been suggested, so that environmental 
concerns would not be subordinated under the international trade rules. However, major structural 
reforms may not be a feasible option. Instead, the efficiency and effectiveness of WTO dispute 
settlement system point to the WTO as a logical forum for the regime clash.  
The conflict between the trade and environment regimes is not new, and came into sharp 
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focus after GATT rulings on the Tuna – Dolphin cases. Others followed, like the Shrimp – Turtle 
cases. The regime clash is common in other issue areas as well. However, what makes the clash 
between trade and environment special is that the WTO has been the major forum for solutions. 
Due to the imbalance of regimes, criticisms have been made about the one-sided perception of the 
WTO in favor of trade. However, criticizing the WTO cannot be the remedy. We must not overlook 
the practicability of amending the GATT Article XX. The most desirable and feasible solution is 
to carefully draft and use expansive languages in amending Article XX to account for existing 
MEAs and to prevent prejudicing future MEAs.   
